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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) has penetrated deeply
into our lives and the number of IoT devices per person is
expected to increase substantially over the next few years. Due
to the characteristics of IoT devices (i.e., low power and low
battery), usage of these devices in critical applications requires
sophisticated security measures. Researchers from academia and
industry now increasingly exploit the concept of blockchains
to achieve security in IoT applications. The basic idea of the
blockchain is that the data generated by users or devices in the
past are verified for correctness and cannot be tampered once it is
updated on the blockchain. Even though the blockchain supports
integrity and non-repudiation to some extent, confidentiality and
privacy of the data or the devices are not preserved. The content
of the data can be seen by anyone in the network for verification
and mining purposes. In order to address these privacy issues,
we propose a new privacy-preserving blockchain architecture for
IoT applications based on attribute-based encryption (ABE) tech-
niques. Security, privacy, and numerical analyses are presented
to validate the proposed model.
Index Terms—Privacy, security, Internet of Things, Blockchain,
attribute based encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various modern-day applications such as smart city, smart
grid, eHealth, and Industry 4.0 are relying on millions of
connected digital devices distributed across people, homes,
roads, and communities etc [1]. These sensors measure data
such as heart rate, blood pressure, weather conditions, location,
traffic conditions, vehicular speed etc based on their charac-
teristics and upload the measured data to their owner/master
periodically. This data enables the master to develop intelligent
algorithms to monitor the subjects in real time. For instance, if
it is a healthcare application then doctors can monitor the pa-
tients’ health condition dynamically and prescribe medications
immediately to avoid any delay and complications.
Even though the IoT technology seems to be exciting and
solving various problems in real time, achieving security and
privacy in IoT is challenging due to its characteristics i.e., low
processing power, distributed nature, and lack of standardiza-
tion [2]. In order to tackle this shortcoming, researchers from
industry and academia are focussing on blockchain fundamen-
tals and customising blockchain based cryptocurrency models
for IoT applications.
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The work in [2] proposed an optimised blockchain tech-
nology suitable for IoT and developed an end-to-end solution
for smart home application. A hierarchical structure has been
proposed in [2] to optimize resource consumption and increase
network scalability. The work in [3] focuses on edge and fog
computing scenarios where the IoT devices located in the edge
of 4G/5G networks can be used to process the sensor data in
a distributed manner using blockchain.
The recent work of [4] exploits blockchain technology in
IoT to avoid the need of a centralised server. Instead of
storing IoT sensor data in centralised servers, the blockchain
technology supports the devices and users to maintain a
distributed database where sensor data can be managed by
individuals similar to crypto currencies [4]. There are few
more recent works proposing similar techniques for different
applications [5], [6]. However, these techniques do not protect
the privacy of data in the transactions. The main reason for
this is that all the techniques rely on symmetric key encryption
for data encryption. If the data is encrypted by symmetric key
schemes such as AES, the key must be shared together with
the data to enable the miners of the blockchain to verify the
content and update the blockchain. This means privacy and
confidentiality of the data generated and shared by the IoT
network is not protected [7].
In this paper, we exploit the state-of-the-art attribute-based
encryption (ABE) technique to address the privacy and confi-
dentiality of the data shared in blockchain based IoT ecosys-
tems. ABE has been known for its simplicity where a single
encryption provides both confidentiality and access control and
has been identified as a potential technology for data sharing
in decentralised networks [8]. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that restructures the blockchain protocol
to absorb ABE and provide end-to-end privacy-preserving
blockchain based IoT ecosystem.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us describe the IoT network model considered in
this paper. Similar to the work in [2], we also consider a
hierarchical approach where there will be a cluster head for
a given set of IoT sensors. The cluster head is assumed to be
more powerful than IoT devices and performs computationally
intensive operations such as data processing and encryption.
The data recorded by IoT devices are transmitted to the cluster
head for processing and transmission. As shown in Figure
1, there are a number of blockchain miners who verify
transactions and contribute to the blockchain. These miners
could be service providers or even cluster heads. In order to
provide ABE there will be a number of attribute authorities
(AAs) part of this network. Let us briefly define the concept
of ABE and how it will be used for blockchain in the next
subsection followed by the blockchain transaction architecture.
A. Attribute based encryption scheme
ABE supports both confidentiality and access control via
single encryption [8]. There are four parties involved in
ABE, namely cluster head (data owners), blockchain miners,
attribute authorities (AA) and distributed ledger (or blockchain
with blocks of transactions). The cluster head aggregates or
processes the data from sensors and encrypts them before the
transaction. The cluster head encrypts the data in such a way
that the transactions can be seen and verified by particular
miners who have the right attributes. In healthcare scenarios,
for example, the cluster head may define a miner policy such
as “DOCTORS” or “NURSES” to its encryption. Hence the
miner who has “DOCTORS” attribute or “NURSES” attribute
can decrypt and verify the transactions. Moreover, once these
transactions are appended in the blockchain (i.e., distributed
ledger system), only users who have these “DOCTOR” or
“NURSES” attributes can be able to use the data. This will
allow the data owner to control the data privacy through fine-
grained access control.
Figure 1: The system model comprises IoT sensors which are
connected to corresponding cluster head, blockchain miners
and attribute authorities.
It is the AAs’ responsibility to verify and issue credentials
for different miners and users based on their attributes. There
are many centralised and decentralised ABE schemes that
have been proposed in the literature [9]–[12]. In this paper,
we use a decentralised ABE scheme where more than one
AA issues credentials for miners and users. This will allow
different sets of attributes to be monitored by different AAs
to avoid any single point-of-failure. The decentralised ABE
contains the five protocols namely Setup, AA Setup, Key
Issuing, Encryption and Decryption. Let us briefly explain
the functionalities of each protocol.
Setup: This protocol takes a predefined security parameter
as input and outputs the system parameters. These system
parameters will be used by AAs who join the system.
AA Setup: Each AA uses the system parameters obtained
from the Setup to generate public and private keys for the
attributes it maintains.
Key Issuing: Miners/User and AA interact via an anonymous
key issuing scheme in order to determine a set of attributes
belonging to the user. Then the AA generates decryption
credentials for those attributes and sends them to the
miners/user.
Encryption: The encryption algorithm will be used by
the cluster head. The cluster head takes a set of attributes
maintained by AAs and the data from sensors as input. Then
it outputs the ciphertext of the data which will be appended
in the transaction.
Decryption: The decryption algorithm will be used by miners
and users of the blockchain. They take the decryption creden-
tials received from AAs and the ciphertext from the transaction
or blockchain as input. The decryption will be successful if
and only if the miner/user attributes satisfy the access structure
of the ciphertext.
Figure 2 shows the variants of ABE schemes considered
for this work [8]. ABE schemes are built based on bilinear
pairing, secret sharing and Lagrangian interpolation [8]. Let
us briefly explain them below:
Bilinear Pairings: Let G1, G2 be two multiplicative groups
of prime order q and let g1 and g2 be generators of G1 and
G2, respectively. Let us denote a bilinear map e : G1 × G2
→ GT . The map has the following three properties:
1 Bilinearity: ∀x ∈ G1,∀y ∈ G2, and a, b ∈ Zq, there is
eˆ(xa, yb) = eˆ(x, y)ab.
2 Non-degeneracy: For ∀x ∈ G1,∀y ∈ G2, there is
eˆ(x, y) 6= 1.
3 Computability: eˆ is an efficient computation.
Lagrange Interpolation: Shamir’s secret sharing uses the
Lagrange interpolation technique to obtain the secret from
shared-secrets. Suppose that p(x) ∈ Zp[x] is a (k − 1)
degree polynomial and secret s = p(0). Let us denote
S = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} and the Lagrange coefficient for xi in
S as
∆xi,S(x) =
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
x− xj
xi − xj .
For a given k different number of values p(x1), p(x2), . . .,
p(xk), the polynomial p(x) can be reconstructed as follows,
p(x) =
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
x− xj
xi − xj =
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)∆xi,S(x),
hence the secret s can be obtained as:
s = p(0) =
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
0− xj
xi − xj .
Now let us assume there are N number of AAs
(A1, . . . , AN ) and denote the set of attributes for Ak as
A˜k = {ak,1, . . . , ak,nk} ∀k. Each AA has a value dk i.e.,
miner/user must have at least dk number of attributes of
this authority to obtain the private key associated with this
AA. Initially, for a given security parameter λ, the Setup
algorithm (S) generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with
prime order p i.e., {G1,G2} ← GS(1λ). The Authority Setup
algorithm (AS) is executed by each AA to randomly gen-
erate public keys (PK) and the corresponding private keys
(SK). The public-private key pairs for Ak are given as
{(Yk, Zk, [Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk ]), (αk, βk, [tk,1, . . . , tk,nk ])}.
Let us denote the attribute set belonging to user u as A˜u and
the common attribute set between user u and authority k as
A˜ku i.e., A˜ku = A˜u
⋂
A˜k. The Key Generation (KG) algorithm
will be used to issue decryption keys to the user u with a set
of attributes A˜u.
Denote the set of attributes used to encrypt message m as
A˜m and the common attribute set between message m and
the authority k as A˜km i.e., A˜m = {A˜1m, . . . , A˜km, . . . , A˜Nm}.
Denote the index set of authorities involved in the ciphertext
of message m as Ic. The encryption algorithm (E) encrypts
the message m ∈ G2 using an attribute set A˜m. To encrypt the
message, the message owner randomly generates s and com-
putes the ciphertext as C =
[
C1, C2, C3, Ck,j ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜km
]
.
If the user has decryption keys for the attributes of message m
then he can obtain the message m from the ciphertext using
the Decryption algorithm (D).
The decentralised ABE scheme in Figure 2 was built on
top of the above fundamentals [8], [9]. Miners and users of
the blockchain network will follow the protocols in Figure
2. In the numerical analysis section later in this paper, we
compare the complexity increase due to the addition of the
ABE scheme.
B. Blockchain Architecture
The use of blockchain technology in IoT has three major
security advantages: 1) the sensor data generated by the IoT
devices will be rigorously verified by a number of miners in
the blockchain network for legitimacy before it is accepted.
This will mitigate several security attacks including data
manipulation attacks by the adversary. 2) once the data is
accepted and appended to the blockchain then the data cannot
be tampered. 3) there is no central authority nor storage server
hence trust of each node will be built by reputation. If any node
is malicious and propagating false data it can be identified by
miners and the reputation of that node will be damaged. Let
us now look at transaction data generated by the cluster head.
1) Blockchain transaction data: Let us consider healthcare
applications where patients use various medical IoT devices to
measure health parameters such as weight, heart rate, blood
pressure, sugar level etc using various sensors in the devices.
Doctors will decide on the types of sensors, and how frequent
the readings must be taken and uploaded. The patients’ smart-
phone or home router or both could act as a cluster head.
During the registration process the cluster head receives a
unique identification number. The cluster head exploits public-
key cryptography to generate a private and public key pair.
The public key will be given to the hospital server where
it is stored against the unique identifier. These information
(patients unique identifier, public key and types of sensors)
can be retrieved by miners and users of the blockchain in the
future. The unique identifier (ID) cannot be used by miners
or users to identify the patient’s privacy sensitive information
such as name, address, etc.
Once the initial setup is completed, the cluster head collects
the sensor data and generates a transaction to distribute to the
peers for validation. As shown in Figure 3, there will be a
number of entries in each transaction. The transaction data
starts with unique ID, date and time, and sequence number.
These are purely used for identification and administrative
purposes. Then application types will be appended. The ap-
plication types i.e., diabetic, cholesterol can be used for easy
identification. If the data will be used for research purposes in
Setup S For a given security parameter λ, S generates the
bilinear groups G1 and G2 with prime order p as follows:
{G1,G2} ← GS(1λ). Let e : G1 × G1 −→ G2 be a bilinear
map and g, h and h1 be the generators of G1 such that
∀ x, y ∈ G1 and ∀ a, b ∈ Zp, e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab. There
are N number of authorities {A1, . . . , AN}: Ak monitors nk
attributes i.e. A˜k = {ak,1 . . . , ak,nk},∀k.
AA Setup AS Security parameters of Ak:
SKk = {αk, βk, and [tk,1, . . . , tk,nk ]} R←−−−Zp, ∀k. Public
parameters of Ak: PKk = {Yk = e(g, g)αk , Zk = gβk , and
[Tk,1 = g
tk,1 , . . . , Tk,nk = g
tk,nk ]}, ∀ k. Ak specifies mk as
minimum number of attributes required to satisfy the access
structure ( mk ≤ nk).
Key Generation KG Collision-Resistant Hash Function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp to generate u from the miners’ global
identity. Attribute set of miner is A˜u: A˜u ∩ A˜k = A˜ku ∀ k.
Ak generates rk,u ∈R Zp and polynomial qx for each node x
(including the leaves) T. For each node x, the degree dx of
the polynomial qx is dx = kx− 1 where kx – threshold value
of that node. Now, for the root node r, set qr(0) = rk,u.
For any other node x, set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)).
Now decryption keys for the user u are generated as
follows: D = Dk,u = g−αkh
βk
rk,u+u h
rk,u
βk+u
1 , D
1
k,u =
h
1
rk,u+u , Djk,u = h
qak,j
(0)
(βk+u)tk,j
1 , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku.
Encryption E Attribute set for the transaction m is A˜m:
A˜m ∩ A˜k = A˜km, ∀k, i.e. A˜m = {A˜1m, . . . , A˜km, . . . , A˜Nm}.
The cluster head of m randomly chooses s ∈R Zp, and
outputs the ciphertext as follows:
C = C1 = m.
∏
k∈IC
e(g, g)αks, C2 = g
s, C3 =∏
k∈IC
gβksand
{
Ck,j = T
s
k,j
}
∀k∈IC ,ak,j∈A˜jm where Ic
denotes the index set of the authorities.
Decryption D In order to decrypt C, the miner u, computes
X, Y and Qk as follows: X =
∏
k∈IC
e (C2, Dk,u) , Y =
e
(
C3, D
1
k,u
)
and Sk =
∏
ak,j∈Akm
e
(
Ck,j , D
j
k,u
)∆
ak,j ,A˜
j
m
(0)
.
Miner then decrypts m as follows: m = C1X
Y
∏
k∈IC
Sk
.
Figure 2: The decentralized ABE scheme adopted for the
blockchain based IoT Ecosystem [8]
future, the application type will enable researchers to aggregate
the correct type of data.
Then based on the application type, the cluster head will
decide on the attributes for encryption. In this healthcare case,
the cluster head will choose attributes such as doctors, nurses,
hospitals, locations etc and build an access structure. The
example shown in Figure 3 has an access structure where
miners or users who have obtained credentials for doctors
or nurses from the AAs can decrypt, verify and use the
data in this transaction. Once the access structure is decided,
the cluster head will apply ABE to encrypt the sensor data
and append the ciphertext in the transaction as shown in
Figure 3. Then the hash value of the transaction data will
be signed by the private key of the cluster head to generate a
digital signature. The generated digital signature will also be
appended in the transaction data. Finally, this transaction data
will be announced to the blockchain network by the cluster
head. The following subsection describes the verification step.
Figure 3: The structure of transaction data generated by the
cluster head. This will be shared with peers in the blockchain
network for verification followed by storage in the blockchain.
2) Transaction verification: As shown in Figure 1, the
miners who are connected directly with the cluster head
obtain this transaction data. Then these miners will spread the
transaction data to other miners for verification. Eventually
all the miners in the blockchain network will receive the
transaction data.
Each miner will check if s/he has right attributes to verify
the transaction. S/he will not proceed if s/he does not have the
right attributes. Otherwise, s/he will retrieve the public key and
sensor types’ details corresponding to the ID from the hospital
server or from the initial block of the blockchain.
S/he will then use his/her credentials obtained from the AAs
for the given attributes to decrypt the encrypted sensor data.
Then the miner will cross check if the types of sensors used
in the transaction is matching with the sensor types obtained
from the hospital server. Then s/he will check if the data value
for each sensor is within the predefined range. For example
blood pressure value must be between 0mmHg and 300mmHg.
This will avoid out-of-range values.
If there is new sensor information or the range of a given
sensor data is out of range, the transaction data will be rejected
by the miner. This news will be spread across the blockchain
network. If the transaction is verified by most of miners who
have right credentials for the attributes then this transaction
data will be passed and queued in the pending block.
3) Mining and adding new block to the blockchain: Similar
to the blockchain model used in crypto currencies, mining of
new blocks in this IoT scenario will also be done periodically.
For example, every ten minutes a new block will be mined
and appended to the existing blockchain.
All the verified transaction data in the pending block will
be used by any miners for mining a new block i.e., mining
a new block is not restricted by attributes. As per blockchain
principles [13], miners will try to find a new hash value for the
pending transaction data subject to restrictions e.g. the hash
value must contain 50 leading zeros.
The restriction will be increased periodically based on the
increment of computing power used by the miners in the
network. For example, if the blockchain is updated every
10 minutes and the new hash value for the current block is
obtained by miners in five minutes then it means the com-
puting power of miners have doubled. Hence the restriction
for generating new hash value will be increased to match the
computing power.
4) Reward system for miners: Blockchain based on crypto
currency models offer crypto coins to the successful miner who
gets the new hash value for the pending transactions. When
it comes to IoT ecosystems, the miners must be rewarded to
make this model sustainable. In the big data world, data is
more valuable and various service providers and research or-
ganisations rely on accurate data to provide efficient services.
The miners can be rewarded with tokens to access the data in
the future.
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Since the proposed solution enforces ABE, the number of
miners who qualify for verification is less than the traditional
blockchain network. If the cluster head chooses too many at-
tributes or very specific attributes then the number of qualified
miners will be reduced. If there are too little miners who can
verify the transaction then that may jeopardise the security of
the blockchain technology. For example a malicious cluster
head may collude with malicious miners to approve falsified
transactions by assigning very specific attributes.
To avoid this problem, the blockchain protocol will specify
the minimum number of miners for verification. To avoid the
case where only few miners are qualified for specific attributes,
the AA will be forced to wait until the number of miners for
an attribute surpasses the minimum number requirement set
by the blockchain protocol.
As we discussed in the introduction, the related works either
keep the transaction data in the plain domain or use symmetric
encryption like the AES for encryption. If the transaction data
is encrypted using AES then the encrypted key will need to be
shared with the transaction to enable verification. This means
anyone in the blockchain network can see the data and there
is no advantage of encryption.
In the proposed work, the number of miners who can view
the data is limited. Only miners who have the right attributes
can see the data. The AAs will scrutinise the miners for their
claimed attributes before issuing the credentials. For example,
miners associated with hospitals may get the credentials for
“DOCTORS” and “NURSES”. However, once the verification
is performed, any miners in the block chain network can
contribute to mining a new block regardless of their attributes.
Hence, the blockchain’s concept of proof-of-work (PoW) is still
preserved in the proposed model.
Traditional IoT systems are known for sybil attacks. How-
ever, in the proposed blockchain-powered IoT system, the
transaction data is verified by a large number of miners before
it is accepted. Unless the transaction data are added to the new
block, sybil attacks have limited impact. Since the proposed
model is built on top of the well researched decentralised ABE
and blockchain technology, we can assume that there is no
security vulnerability in the rest of the model.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSES
Let us first compare the proposed model against AES based
blockchain models [2], [5], [6] in terms of scalability and key
management. When AES is used for encrypting transactions
then the number of symmetric keys used in the system is
proportional to the number of cluster heads times the number
of unique keys used by cluster heads. This will exponentially
increase the complexity of key management. However, when
it comes to ABE, the total number keys used in the system
is proportional to the number of attributes. In simple terms,
if we consider healthcare IoT ecosystems with 10000 patients
then we need to manage 10000 AES keys. On the contrary, for
the ABE based proposed scheme, for example, we can run the
healthcare model with 10000 patients with just 50 attributes
hence only 50 keys.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of ABE will increase the com-
putational cost for encryption and decryption in contrast to
AES systems. Let us numerically check the computation costs
associated with the inclusion of ABE scheme for blockchains.
As shown in Figure 2, the ABE scheme has five distinct proto-
cols. However, the miners are only involved in the computation
during the decryption step and the cluster heads are involved
in the encryption step. Since the other three protocols can be
executed off-line, we simply ignore them for this comparison.
Also the computational cost for hash functions used in Figure
2 is negligible compared to pairing and exponentiation. Let
the computational time (in ms) for one multiplication, one
exponentiation, and one pairing be denoted as Cm, Cex, and
Cp, respectively.
For comparison, we use the benchmark time values given in
the popular pairing-based cryptography library namely jPBC
in [14]. Table I compares the time values (in ms) for Cm,
Cex, and Cp for two different testbeds: testbed 1 uses Intel(R)
Core(TM) 2 Quad CPU Q6600 with 2.40GHz and 3 GB
memory running on Ubuntu 10.04 and testbed 2 uses HTC
Desire HD A9191 smart phone running on Android 2.2. We
can safely assume that the miners use the powerful testbed 1
for decryption while cluster heads use mobile devices similar
to the testbed 2 for the encryption.
Table I: Time complexity measures for two different testbeds.
Testbed 1 (ms) Testbed 2 (ms)
Cp 14.6 491.2
Cex 2.8 34.1
Cm 1.8 20
Let us denote the number of attributes used for encryption
as n per AA. Table II shows the total time required for
encryption (by the cluster head) and for decryption (by the
miners) for different number of AAs K. In order to graphically
visualize the time complexity of the ABE, we plotted the
time complexities given in Table II by varying the number
of attributes, n, and number of AAs K in Figure 4.
From Figures 4a to 4d, the time complexity increases
linearly with the number of attributes per AAs for both cluster
head and miners. Time complexity for decryption is almost
four times quicker than encryption even though the processing
power of Testbed 1 is ten times faster than Testbed 2 in Table
I. This is due to the number of operations involved in the
decryption process.
It can also be noted from Figures 4a to 4d, that time
complexity slightly increases when there more number on AAs
for the same number of attributes. For example, if we consider
that there are in total ten attributes, then time complexities for
encryption and decryption for one AA are 500ms and 225ms,
respectively. However, when the number of AAs increases to
five, the time complexities for encryption and decryption for
two attributes per AA are 900ms and 300ms, respectively. As
per ABE literature, distributing the attributes across AAs will
increase the security rather than having a single AA. Hence,
the presence of multiple AAs increases the security subject to
slight increase in time complexity.
Overall, for ten attributes-based encryption and decryption,
the ABE based blockchain model proposed in this paper is
nearly 12 a second slower than a blockchain model with-
out any encryption. As can be seen from Table I that the
performance comparison is based on four-year-old testbeds
and the time complexity values for the current state-of-the-
art mobiles and computers must be much faster than the old
testbeds. Nevertheless, the proposed model provides privacy
assurance to the transaction data of the blockchain not only
during the verification but also in the blockchain. The fine-
grained nature of ABE only allows certain miners and users
with specific attributes to access the data. However, any miners
in the network can contribute to the mining process of new
blocks regardless of their attributes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a novel blockchain architecture to
preserve the privacy of transaction data using the attribute-
based encryption technique. This is the first approach that
combines the state-of-the-art encryption technique with the
blockchain technology. The simplicity and fine-grained nature
of attribute based encryption controls who can see and use
the transaction data. The proposed model slightly changed
the blockchain protocol procedure to adopt the attribute-based
encryption technique without jeopardising the fundamental
security properties of blockchains. We analyse the security
and privacy of the proposed model and developed strategies to
mitigate some known attacks. The numerical analysis section
showed that the blockchain-powered IoT can benefit from
attribute based encryption in terms of achieving privacy for
minimal computational overhead.
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